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Abstract
While the categories of control and resistance have provided important frames 
of reference to understand workplace relations, we argue that they offer a limited 
analytical range when investigating conduct in public institutions where work still 
has sizeable elements of discretion – despite the increasing demands of performance 
measurement that have been a central component of new public management. Here, 
we investigate the HBO series, The Wire, and situate it as a piece of social science 
fiction. By affording more attention to the different ‘codes’ of policework depicted on 
the show we develop a more pluralistic understanding of workplace conduct. In tracing 
out different normative orders that characterize these codes, we consider The Wire’s 
Cedric Daniels’ distinctive positioning in relation to performance measurement and the 
predominant normative order of ‘the numbers game’ and argue that he consistently 
displays the code of an ethical bureaucrat.
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Introduction
This article builds on a growing body of organization research that draws on popular cul-
ture for the insights it can offer into management and organizational life (see, for example, 
Buzzanell and D’Enbeau, 2014; Rhodes and Parker, 2008; Zundel et al., 2014). We focus 
on the 2002–2008 HBO cable television series, The Wire (Simon and Burns, 2008), to 
provide insights into how actors respond to performance measurement, which is a perva-
sive output control in many organizations, particularly with the spread of ‘market rational-
ity’ into the public sector as a result of new public management (NPM) (Bevan and Hood, 
2006; Doolin, 2002; Du Gay and Salaman, 1992). We propose venturing beyond accounts 
that focus on ever more pervasive control (Flyverbom et al., 2015; Kärreman and 
Alvesson, 2009; Manley and Williams, 2019) or reclassifying resistance (Courpasson 
et al., 2012; McCabe et al., 2020; Thomas and Davies, 2005) to focus instead on the codes 
through which actors work. In working life, ‘a man must have a code’1 as the capable, 
amiable and heavy drinking Homicide Detective Bunk Moreland so aptly puts it (The 
Wire, season 1, episode 7). Such codes, as depicted on The Wire in the Baltimore police 
force, are enacted within a realm of discretion that remains characteristic of police work 
(see Johnston, 1988; Lipsky, 2010). Thus, classifying conduct through the lens of control 
or resistance can detract from the complexity this gives rise to.
The Wire is apposite for our purposes here because of its unique sociological scope in 
presenting a fictional portrayal of the narratives of multiple organizational lives, includ-
ing Baltimore drug gangs, the press, the docks, the education system and – the key focus 
of our analysis – the Baltimore police force. We characterize The Wire as a piece of 
‘social science fiction’ (Penfold-Mounce et al., 2011). The concept of social science fic-
tion rests largely on Wright Mills’s (2000: 19) important insight that social science is not 
the exclusive preserve of academics and that journalists, novelists and now television 
directors and producers also have social insights (see also Bryant and Pollock, 2010). 
The fiction here is a fictional truth, which by telling stories may get closer to experience 
than a collection of facts or data (see Penfold-Mounce et al., 2011: 154–155).
The key contributions of this article stem from the application of Herbert’s (1997) 
categorization of ‘normative orders’ in policework, which emerged from his ethno-
graphic analysis of the Los Angeles police force. Herbert (1998: 347) defines normative 
order as a ‘set of generalized rules and common practices oriented around a common 
value’. He identifies six (at times conflictual) predominant normative orders in police 
work: law, bureaucratic authority and control, adventure and machismo, competence, 
safety and morality (Herbert, 1998). We rework this categorization to include the pre-
dominant neoliberal normative order in public institutions depicted on The Wire: ‘the 
numbers game’ (The Wire, season 4, episode 11; see also Du Gay and Salaman, 1992: 
629). A game that has emerged with NPM and performance measurement.
The application of this conception of normative orders to The Wire makes contribu-
tions in the following respects: first, it shifts our analytical focus in important ways 
from compliance/resistance to the codes through which characters work and act in 
response to surveillance and performance measurement (see Sewell et al., 2012: 208); 
rather than simply in opposition to these processes. We highlight a need to move beyond 
classifications of what is and is not resistance (Contu, 2008; Courpasson et al., 2012; 
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Fleming and Spicer, 2003; McCabe et al., 2020; Thomas and Davies, 2005), to a richer 
understanding of people’s working lives, in which at different points they work against, 
work around or actively support a given set of dominant institutional normative orders, 
like the numbers game. This fresh analytical lens is particularly important in working 
environments where organizational purposes are contested (Hoggett, 2006) and where 
there is a high level of discretion at street level – such as the police force (Bohte and 
Meier, 2000: 180; Lipsky, 2010). Such an approach also advances from existing 
accounts that stress ever more pervasive workplace controls under NPM (see, for exam-
ple, Clarke and Knights, 2015; McCann et al., 2020) by examining the under-theorized 
position of public sector workers who exercise significant discretion in delivering pol-
icy (Lipsky, 2010). Second, this analytical frame also contributes to the literature on 
The Wire, since much of the literature has focused on the power of failing institutions 
(Anderson; 2010; Bandas, 2011; McMillan, 2008; Mittell, 2009), along with some 
insightful character studies (see, for example, Beck, 2009; Bryant and Pollock, 2010; 
Kraniauskas, 2009; Penfold-Mounce et al., 2011). However, the concept of normative 
orders enables us to trace out the multiple lived codes of policework that are depicted 
on the show in a fuller and more pluralistic fashion (see Herbert, 1997: 20). Third, we 
offer a distinctive reading of the series by focusing on the fictional character of Cedric 
Daniels – initially a Lieutenant of the Narcotics Unit who becomes a senior manager in 
the Baltimore Police Department. We argue that Daniels presents a portrayal of the 
predicaments around Du Gay’s (2000) ethics of office (Du Gay, 2005, 2008), which take 
us beyond a resistance and compliance frame of analysis. Daniels retains a set of classic 
bureaucratic ideals, through his commitment to task and detail, law and bureaucratic 
authority (Du Gay and Vikkelsø, 2017).
Our case rests on the normative orders framework, which offers distinctive insights 
into The Wire and working life in organizations subject to NPM, in the following steps: 
first, the implications of The Wire for organizational research are drawn out and situated 
in relation to previous engagements with popular culture in the field. Second, we analyse 
The Wire in terms of NPM, neoliberalism and performance measurement, and explain 
how we understand this in relation to the realm of discretion that continues to character-
ize policework. In the accompanying subsection, ‘Codes and normative orders’, we also 
introduce the key concepts that frame the investigation. We then turn to The Wire’s rich 
depiction of the dynamics around performance measurement. The series highlights the 
importance of the games surrounding performance measurement, their complex and, at 
times, counter-productive effects, and also how competing codes and normative orders 
exist around performance measurement. We then situate Cedric Daniels as an ‘ethical 
bureaucrat’ in the context of NPM (Hoggett, 2005: 185) and discuss how he responds to 
the practices of gaming the stats portrayed on the show. In the following ‘Discussion’ 
section, we argue that analysing normative orders in The Wire offers a means to advance 
from the existing organizational literature on surveillance and control, by affording 
greater recognition to workplace discretion in certain contexts of NPM. We also argue 
that this approach offers an alternative to reclassifying resistance, towards a deeper anal-
ysis of the multiple codes displayed in the context of NPM; and that this presents a richer 
way of understanding the compromised position of the ethical bureaucrat that takes us 
beyond the resistance/compliance dichotomy.
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The Wire as social science fiction
In this article we argue that televisual dramas like The Wire can be considered social 
science fiction (see Bryant and Pollock, 2010; Penfold-Mounce et al., 2011) because 
they offer valuable insights into social relations, especially in and around work. Social 
science fiction refers to fiction with a sociological sensibility. There is a danger, when 
televisual entertainment is explored for insights into management and is labelled as 
popular culture (Buzzanell and D’Enbeau, 2014; Rhodes and Parker, 2008; Rhodes and 
Westwood, 2008) that this, often unintentionally, further sediments the distinction 
between ‘high’ academic theory and ‘popular’ mass entertainment. One reason why 
social science fiction is useful and has resonance for us is that, rather than simply call-
ing for greater academic analysis of how management is portrayed in popular culture 
(Rhodes and Parker, 2008), the concept pushes us to examine popular culture alongside 
academic research (Osborne et al., 2008). Drawing on social science fiction to better 
understand organizational life has further methodological advantages in offering a rich 
collection of illustrations of institutional working lives. Particularly a show like The 
Wire which has been described as possessing an ethnographic sensibility (Holt and 
Zundel, 2014: 580; Parker, 2012: 29) in portraying the experiences of a range of sub-
jects across organizational contexts.
It has also been argued that management research remains divorced from the lived expe-
riences of organizational life (for some classic versions of this argument see Knights and 
Willmott, 1999; Lennie, 1999). Yet how one captures these lived experiences remains a 
pressing theoretical and methodological challenge. Drawing on social science fiction helps 
to address this because it offers portrayals that viewers can identify with. As fiction, The 
Wire can resonate with the working lives of different viewers as they approach the show 
from a range of different organizational experiences. Social science fiction can also offer 
creative ways of (re)theorizing organizational experience (see Rhodes and Westwood, 
2008: 6). Furthermore, dramatic fiction encompasses different intersecting institutions and 
contrasting lives lived in and through these institutions, which The Wire does in rich detail; 
conversely the academic article tends to have a more singular analytical focus on particular 
cases of working life or on particular institutions (see Wilson and Chaddha, 2010).
As well as capturing lived experiences, the social science fiction of The Wire also 
gives us a clearer grounding in how codes and institutional dynamics unfold in practice. 
While social science fiction is clearly a form of fiction, when researchers name and char-
acterize social realities in particular ways they are also theoretically trying to make sense 
of them, at least one remove from the actors themselves. The show’s creators, Ed Burns 
and David Simon, construct a rich account of Baltimore and its institutions, which forms 
a kind of autoethnography given their respective backgrounds working in the police 
force, and in schools (Bryant and Pollock, 2010: 718), and for the Baltimore press in the 
case of Simon. While social science conventionally names social phenomena through 
nominalizations such as ‘control’, ‘surveillance’ or ‘resistance’; as social science fiction, 
The Wire inverts such analysis by beginning from a rich depiction of the lived codes 
characters embody in working life.
Thus, quality social science fiction can give us a richer perspective on ‘the conditions 
of individuation’ (McMillan, 2008) in which subjects are shaped by, but also make clear 
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choices within, institutions. Indeed, as Bryant and Pollock (2010: 712) note perceptively, 
this ‘fiction is to be understood neither as fantasy nor falsehood; it creates a logic for the 
arrangement of actions that produces intelligibility from the chaos of events that consti-
tute the social’. Indeed, this is precisely what we endeavour to do as social scientists. 
Social science fiction at its best, and The Wire in our view certainly warrants this tag, can 
provide a rich portrayal of intersecting institutions, including the police force and the 
educational system, that people inhabit. But social science fiction also offers a more 
character centric approach to the social by dramatizing multiple (albeit fictitious) lives 
lived in, and through, institutions. It therefore offers a distinctive and important addi-
tional perspective in the social sciences.
There has been a limited amount of academic research on The Wire in the field of 
organization and management – in total three academic articles (see Parker, 2012; Holt 
and Zundel, 2014; Zundel et al., 2014). The focus here has often been on the institutional 
dimensions of social life that are depicted on the show (see also Johnson-Lewis, 2009; 
Levine, 2015; McMillan, 2008). But how different individuals experience the realities 
and pressures of institutional working life, and the codes through which they respond to 
them, has been somewhat neglected. Interestingly, this dimension of the series has often 
been emphasized by The Wire’s executive producer, David Simon, in subsequent inter-
views. For example, in a revealing quote, Simon (2009) notes:
It’s about how institutions have an effect on individuals and it’s about how regardless of what 
you’re committed to, whether you are a cop, a drug dealer, a long shoreman, a judge, or a 
lawyer. You must ultimately compromise and contend with whatever institution you’ve 
committed to.
Simon is alluding to the complex question of the relation between individuals and 
institutions, and The Wire presents us with valuable source material to bring ‘individu-
als back into institutional theory’ (Lawrence et al., 2011: 53). The individual dimen-
sion here concerns whether a given actor compromises or contends with the norms and 
requirements of their institution in particular circumstances not of their own choosing. 
This points to the centrality of the different ‘codes’ characters display in The Wire; a 
theme to which we will return but first we set out the broader institutional context of 
NPM and policing.
New public management and policework discretion
Across different series, The Wire portrays a range of public institutions in Baltimore, 
including the police force and the education system, increasingly subject to metric driven 
public management practices. NPM can be understood broadly as the process of bringing 
business-like practices into the public sector (Vogt, 2001); one key dimension of which 
is the increasing use of performance management and measurement (Bevan and Hood, 
2006; Bohte and Meier, 2000; Hood, 2006; Kelman and Friedman, 2009; McGivern and 
Ferlie, 2007; Moynihan, 2008). NPM can be connected more broadly to an expansion of 
neoliberal principles into the public sector through the growing emphasis on customers 
and competition (see Du Gay and Salaman, 1992; Foucault, 2008).
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Foucault’s 1979 lectures on neoliberalism are prescient here. For Foucault (2008: 
131), the key problem of neoliberalism is how the exercise of political power can be 
modelled on the market economy where competition is ‘the very source and foundation 
of society’ that only has to be allowed to rise to the surface. These lectures date from 
roughly the same time as the inception of NPM after the crises of governance in Britain 
and the USA in the 1970s (Gruening, 2001; Johnston, 1988: 54). Foucault’s positing of 
neoliberalism as a general effort to resituate society itself according to principles of 
enterprise and competition, resonates with NPM. Foucault also distinguishes neoliberal-
ism from the governmental practice of ‘laissez-faire’, as he notes, ‘laissez-faire is turned 
into do-not-laissez-faire government, in the name of the law of the market, which will 
enable each of its activities to be measured and assessed’ (emphasis in original, Foucault, 
2008: 247). It is precisely the effects of this competitive measurement of public institu-
tions according to an artificially constructed ‘law of the market’ that leads to ‘a filtering 
of every action by the public authorities in terms of contradiction, lack of consistency 
and nonsense’ (Foucault, 2008: 246). This is reflected in The Wire, through the efforts of 
middle managers and officers to write off murders as accidents at the start of season 2, or 
in season 4 in their reluctance to discover bodies in boarded up houses because it will 
leave the clearance rate for homicide cases under 50%.
Where does the spread of this competitive ethos into the public sector leave employee 
subjectivity? Here the literature tends to stress an enhanced means of neoliberal control 
that is so effective it reconstructs identity through performance measures (Clarke and 
Knights, 2015: 1880; Lorenz, 2012). Although the tensions this gives rise to between 
public purposes and the competitive ethos have also been explored (see, for example, 
Doolin, 2002: 385; Stokes and Clegg, 2002: 238–239; Thomas and Davies, 2002). One 
aspect that remains under-theorized is the position of public sector workers who are 
inescapably ‘policy deliverers with broad discretion’ – or street-level bureaucrats 
(Lipsky, 2010: 25). Where does street-level discretion fit into this story of pervasive 
output controls that shape competitive subjectivities? Arguably this element of discretion 
applies strongly to policework. Indeed, as Johnston (1988: 53) notes, ‘the exercise of 
discretion by front-line officers as to which laws to implement, under what circum-
stances, and in what manner’ is a defining characteristic of ‘normal police behaviour’.
McMillan (2008; see also Mittell, 2009) argues that The Wire reflects the power of insti-
tutions in ‘producing (and destroying) individual subjects by penetrating their “forms of 
life” with disciplinary power’. Conversely what The Wire highlights in regard to the police 
force is that, while the disciplinary power of institutions reshapes conduct, it is not abso-
lute. The demands of NPM and performance measurement ‘partly closes the open’ (empha-
sis in original, Hammer, 2011: 91) but not absolutely. Even if the demands of senior officers 
to secure statistical ‘performance’ on measures is always somewhere in the background; it 
is an output-based measure and often a crude one (see Bevan and Hood, 2006; McCann 
et al., 2020) that is necessarily at a remove from the work on the ground of the street-level 
bureaucrat (Lipsky, 2010). This applies particularly in public institutions where underlying 
purposes are politically contentious (Hoggett, 2006), and The Wire continually highlights 
tensions around the purposes of policing. One key example is the desire of senior managers 
and politicians to secure some easy street-level arrests of addicts and low-level dealers; 
while the purpose of certain organizational units, like Major Crimes that Lieutenant Cedric 
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Daniels heads in season 1, is to undertake slower and deeper investigations to uncover 
underlying criminal networks. This highlights a key discretionary power of the police 
around where and (equally crucially) when to exercise the power of arrest in an ongoing 
investigation (see Moskos, 2008: 121) – something often contested at the level of opera-
tional practice on The Wire.
Codes and normative orders
Thus, we can only understand the diverse codes of police conduct and practice by taking 
discretion seriously, since in practice it means that different, at times contrasting, codes 
characterize policework. The concept of normative orders offers a descriptive and non-
universalizing focus here, and it provides a lens into how actors act differently within 
particular institutional contexts. Herbert (1997: 19) defines normative orders as rules and 
practices that structure action around a primary value. The first two key normative orders 
within policework are law and bureaucratic authority. In terms of law as a central norma-
tive order, other authors have been more sceptical about its role in policing (see Manning, 
2003: 35). Bittner (1970: 35) for example defines policing through the ‘distribution of 
situationally justified force in society’, and law is arguably secondary to this. As Manning 
(2003: 39) notes in regard to the police, ‘the most salient lasting and important decision 
is whether to apply the law’ rather than the law being the definitive normative order per 
se, which again leaves considerable scope for discretion (Lipsky, 2010). Herbert’s 
account serves to redress the balance somewhat by emphasizing that the enforcement of 
the law serves as a key ‘normative value’ in establishing and retaining the legitimacy of 
the police force (Herbert, 1998: 353). Crucially for Herbert it is one powerful normative 
order among others in police work. The second normative order is that of bureaucratic 
authority, which is necessary to ensure that the organization can act ‘in a coordinated 
fashion to secure public order’ (Herbert, 1997: 62). Crucial to bureaucratic authority here 
are ideals such as the chain of command (Herbert, 1997) and due process according to 
clear lines of authority (see Du Gay, 2000; Du Gay and Vikkelsø, 2017).
The next normative order is that of adventure/machismo, a ‘subcultural collection of 
rules and values’ based around power and aggressiveness (Herbert, 1997: 80) frequently 
expressed on The Wire through the desire to get onto street corners and aggressively hunt 
down low-level dealers. The normative order of ‘machismo’ underlines the gender 
dynamics of the show, with some characters expressing a masculinist conception of 
policing – most obviously the inept ‘Herc’ Hauk – through a keenness to get on corners 
and make easy arrests. This approach is frequently associated with ineffective policing. 
While the alternative, competence normative order of policing, is rooted in deep, pains-
taking investigations through developing informants and establishing wire taps.
The next normative order is that of morality (Herbert, 1997). This consists both of a 
clear sense of right and wrong but is also connected to the social aspects of policing, in 
seeking to develop community relations. Similarly, on The Wire this moral dimension is 
often depicted as a social awareness of the causes of addiction and murder – thus best 
termed as social morality. Take the efforts in season 4 of Bunny Colvin – after he has 
been forced to leave his position as Major in Baltimore’s Western District – when he 
works on a school project with ‘corner kids’ to develop a different, less statistics driven, 
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approach to learning. Target driven measures in public bureaucracies, as Carter et al. 
(1995: 49) note, often have the function of tin openers rather than dials, in opening up a 
can of worms (Bevan and Hood, 2006: 520) – or rather highlighting a deeper and more 
intractable set of underlying social causes (see Bohte and Meier, 2000: 174) – classed as 
beyond the remit of the public institution. That is, the normative order of social morality 
seeks to look inside the tin at the underlying reasons for patterns of crime and to find 
potential ways to address them, despite their scale.
While Herbert (1997) also includes the normative order of safety, there is little evi-
dence of this on The Wire since the series tends to concentrate on heroic street-level 
officers; as well as senior managers (and some middle managers) who ordinarily remain 
office bound. One other normative order that we do see in The Wire and which is not 
included in Herbert’s (1997) normative orders is that of ‘the numbers game’ (see also 
Moskos, 2008). This element of strategic calculation often characterizes the conduct of 
ambitious middle managers and ‘successful’ senior managers. The spread of neoliberal 
performance measurement generates a normative order of strategic gaming around num-
bers. What The Wire highlights is the extent to which performance measures actually 
generate a distinctive normative order that shapes the conduct of certain actors, in a man-
ner that is reflective of the neoliberal principle of using market competition in govern-
ance (Foucault, 2008).
These different normative orders are relevant for tracing out the different codes of 
policework depicted in The Wire – codes are best seen as collections of normative orders 
and characters at times cross into different normative orders over the course of their 
policework. For Herbert (1997), normative orders combine the insights of Foucault and 
Weber in a more pluralistic fashion. This applies to The Wire too since, as we will see, 
while one character reflects Weberian bureaucratic authority, Cedric Daniels; others 
adopt a neoliberal NPM ethos of strategic calculation and gaming that resonates with 
Foucault’s conception of neoliberalism.
Gaming and performance measurement
Performance measurement has been researched across institutional contexts (see, for 
example, Kallio et al., 2017; McGivern and Ferlie, 2007; Muller, 2018; Power, 2004; 
Starbuck, 2005) but our particular interest here is in strategic gaming surrounding perfor-
mance measurement. There are some studies of gaming performance measures in the 
organizational literature (see, for example, Bohte and Meier, 2000; Butler et al., 2017; 
Kelman and Friedman, 2009; McGivern and Ferlie, 2007) but research here remains 
limited, probably due to methodological difficulties in finding gaming activities in com-
plex organizations (Bohte and Meier, 2000: 175). Burawoy (1979) in his classic study of 
consent in the Greer machine shop, highlights how gaming is widespread through ‘mak-
ing out’ practices that get round existing rules in order to maximize individual productiv-
ity; yet he stresses how as a result ‘a game generates consent with respect to its roles’ 
(Burawoy, 1979: 81). In the public sector, where task and purposes are contentious (see 
Hoggett, 2006), it seems likely that the relation to consent is less straightforward. Indeed, 
in The Wire characters clearly work against certain managerial orders but they do so for 
the sake of broader organizational purposes, or different normative orders of policing, 
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such as social morality. Bunny Colvin’s Hamsterdam experiment in season 3 in which he 
in effect decriminalizes drug use in one part of Baltimore to reduce crime significantly 
elsewhere is one clear example (see Bryant and Pollock, 2010). What we see in this case 
and in many others is a conflict between normative orders, between the social morality 
normative order (arguably with the normative order of competence mixed in too) and the 
more dominant normative orders of law and bureaucratic authority, which of course 
eventually reassert themselves with Major Colvin’s sacking.
As noted above, the normative order of ‘the numbers game’ (The Wire, season 4, epi-
sode 10) is a crucial one that is missing from Herbert’s (1997) analysis. This is one of the 
things that makes The Wire so valuable as social science fiction: there are strong suspi-
cions that ‘gaming the metrics occurs in every realm’ (Muller, 2018: 3). However, 
research is not equipped to document these trends due to access constraints and ethics. 
Accounts of gaming in public institutions, especially the police force, are relatively 
scarce by comparison (for some exceptions not focused on policing see Bohte and Meier, 
2000; Hood, 2006; McGivern and Ferlie, 2007). However, Rodger Patrick (2014), draw-
ing on 30 years’ experience in the UK Midlands police force, including as a Detective 
Chief Inspector (combined with Freedom of Information requests), documents statistical 
gaming practices that are pervasive enough to be characterized as ‘organizational in 
nature’ in the UK police – particularly with NPM in the 1990s. Patrick (2014) outlines 
how political pressures, which became management targets around reducing crime, led 
to widespread gaming practices, such as reclassifying crimes to downgrade them or 
deliberately under reporting crime (see also Skogan, 1974). Patrick (2014) sheds light on 
the gaming practices induced by performance measurement pressures. But his principal 
interest is in documenting these practices, rather than considering how middle managers 
and ‘street-level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky, 2010) might respond differently to the tensions 
they give rise to, which is the central focus in our analysis of The Wire.
The ethical stances that subjects adopt towards performance measures have also been 
discussed in some rich cases (see, for example, King and Learmouth, 2015; Sewell and 
Barker, 2006; Sewell et al., 2012). In their study of an Australian call centre, Sewell et al. 
describe the conflicts that arose from opposing performance discourses of ‘care and 
coercion’. In this case study, Sewell et al. (2012: 208) note that performance measure-
ment opens up ‘questions of ethics but not an ethics that is extrapolated from the univer-
sal moral absolutes associated with particular political ideologies’. This is why the 
concept of normative orders becomes so useful in offering a pluralistic perspective that 
enables us to trace out different codes and normative orders around performance 
measurement.
Methodology
We have long been enthusiastic viewers of The Wire and have been involved in countless 
discussions about the show for years. From this starting point as engaged and sympa-
thetic followers of the series, we took notes on each of the 60 episodes of the series and 
separately re-watched all scenes that were related to performance management and the 
‘numbers game’ – a key normative order that frames our analysis of The Wire. We identi-
fied Cedric Daniels as a central figure who displays a collection of normative orders that 
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take us beyond the control and resistance dichotomy in performance measurement. Key 
word searches were also undertaken of each episode script to identify the use of reoccur-
ring terms related to performance measurement and workplace responses to it, such as 
‘the stats’, ‘gaming’, ‘natural police’ and ‘chain of command’. Episodes with key words 
in were also re-watched, with each author taking separate notes on relevant episodes and 
then comparing them. It should be noted that the application of normative orders and Du 
Gay’s (2000) conception of an ‘ethical bureaucrat’ was a ‘slow and uncertain’ process 
(Law, 2004: 10), in which instances that seemed to question our initial account were 
given equal attention to episodes and scenes that supported this reading.
Performance measurement and competing codes on The 
Wire
Gaming, as portrayed in The Wire, refers to reducing one’s working life to scoring highly 
on whatever measure is needed for professional survival and success. This constitutes a 
dominant normative order, the ‘numbers game’, that yields professional success. The 
measure becomes the institutional objective that must be met. In The Wire, gaming the 
measures is the norm and the normative orders that conflict with this are the exception. 
At the same time, the underlying social causes of crime – social deprivation, inequality, 
absence of opportunity, violent peer groups – are beyond the capacity of the police force 
to address (see Manning, 1977: 16), and thus the measure itself remains divorced from 
the underlying conditions that produce crime. This is highlighted at the end of each series 
of The Wire when – often after a number of arrests in the final episode (following craftily 
orchestrated plea bargaining to reduce sentences) – there is a montage with accompany-
ing music in which the previous patterns of crime reassert themselves, even though the 
position of individual characters often changes.
The portrayal of gaming in The Wire encompasses both reclassifying or artificially 
‘bending’ data to make it more favourable to managerial targets, and reducing one’s con-
duct to meeting the targets that are preconditions for success (see Bevan and Hood, 2006; 
Muller, 2018: 24–25) and it is thus strategically and actively adhered to by subjects; rather 
than being something subjects simply passively comply with (McGivern and Ferlie, 2007; 
McMillan, 2009). One defence of performance measurement might be that reducing one’s 
conduct to performing on the measure is not necessarily bad, since it does not entail being 
dishonest. It just reflects a need for better and more rounded measures, and therefore one 
can distinguish ethically between active dishonesty and reductive targeting (see Kelman 
and Friedman, 2009). Yet in The Wire these two forms of gaming can be difficult to dis-
tinguish in practice. For example, at the start of season 2, the police are quick to claim that 
the discovery of 13 women’s bodies in a cargo container should be classified as accidental 
deaths; since they do not have any incentive to take on a complex and difficult multiple 
murder investigation that potentially will undermine their statistical performance. It is not 
that the police force working in the Baltimore docks are actively being dishonest. It is 
simply that they do not have any extrinsic motivation to undertake a difficult additional 
investigation into how the women died, which will potentially damage statistical perfor-
mance if these cases become classified as unsolved murders.
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As well as being widespread, ‘gaming the stats’ – more commonly referred to as ‘juk-
ing the stats’ in The Wire – also denotes a particular normative order that is characteristic 
of the spread of the neoliberal ethos under NPM, and the emergence of a strategic ‘cal-
culating self’ (Du Gay and Salaman, 1992: 629) in which one reduces one’s role to hit-
ting target measures. A position in which the institutional numbers game takes precedence, 
and where the most effective strategy is to adopt particular strategies to win games with-
out actually strictly cheating (Macdonald and Kam, 2007: 641) – often by bending the 
rules rather than breaking them (as Marla Daniels puts it in The Wire, season 5, episode 
10). What The Wire offers us is an analysis of performance measurement as a series of 
ongoing subjective experiences (Fay et al., 2010: 28) that characters react to in various 
and conflicting ways according to their codes and normative orders.
The Wire also highlights how characters cross between different normative orders at 
times in unexpected ways. Take Jay Landsmann the overweight Sergeant in the Homicide 
Division who rarely leaves his office and is a strategic follower of ‘the numbers game’ 
but for purposes of ‘self-preservation’ (The Wire, season 2, episode 1) rather than profes-
sional advancement. Yet Landsmann also displays a wider sense of social morality, for 
example at one point Bubbles – an amiable heroin addict who has previously served as 
an informant – finds himself responsible for the murder of his young sidekick, Sherrod, 
after he was ‘dipping’ into his supply and dies from taking spiked heroin (intended for 
somebody that is robbing Bubbles). Landsmann questions Bubbles in custody and he 
confesses in a distraught state, but to the surprise of one of his officers he allows him to 
leave uncharged even though this weakens the overall statistical performance of the 
Homicide Division. Thus, while the numbers game is a pervasive normative order in 
policework, in The Wire characters often move between normative orders and at times 
move into conflicting ones over the course of the five series.
‘Juking the stats’ and natural police
The most skilled and active practitioner of the numbers game is, clearly, Major Rawls. 
As Rawls notes when he tries to avoid his unit taking on responsibility for a difficult 
multiple murder investigation:
I have fought and scratched and clawed for four months to get my clearance rate up above 50% 
and right now it stands at exactly 51.6. Do you happen to know what my clearance rate will be 
if I take 13 whodunits off your hands? – 39.4%. (Major Rawls, The Wire, season 2, episode 3)
Yet, there is an alternative code of policing that the most talented police embody, which 
is reflected in the label ‘natural police’. These figures, principally Jimmy McNulty and 
Lester Freamon, are respected for their professional work but are never promoted above 
detective level. These officers reflect alternative normative orders of policing based 
around social morality and competence, that takes precedence over both law and bureau-
cratic authority – although this is particularly the case for McNulty. Both detectives fear-
lessly undertake complex and deep investigations of drug networks through wire taps 
and developing informants to build cases against major figures in the Baltimore drug 
world. These officers pay little attention to the dominant measures of performance that 
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are narrowly based around statistical clearance rates. As Jimmy McNulty, a classic 
example of ‘natural police’, explains to his long-standing friend Bunk: ‘Fuck the fucking 
numbers already. The fucking numbers destroyed this department’ (Jimmy McNulty, The 
Wire, season 5, episode 3).
The dualistic characterization of natural police and statistical gamers, dominant in 
The Wire’s portrayal of the police force, has been critiqued (see Brooks, 2009) and seems 
to reaffirm anti-bureaucratic sentiment, which Du Gay (2000, 2005: 5) suggests is a reoc-
curring problem in existing critiques of bureaucracy. Weber for example refused to 
accept the idea of a ‘unified moral personality’ (Du Gay, 2000: 29) and instead stressed 
one’s comportment and calling within specific domains (Goldman, 2005: 56; Weber, 
1978: 19). However, The Wire does present an important counter-example to anti-
bureaucratic sentiment. In the fourth and fifth series, McNulty and his colleague Lester 
Freamon consider their main objective to be the capture of the brutal leader of a ruthless 
drug gang responsible for multiple murders: Marlow Stanfield. However, as political 
priorities shift for the new mayor of Baltimore due to a crisis in schools funding, the 
resources of the police department are dramatically cut, leading to the closing down of 
the Major Crimes Unit that was tracking Marlow and his associates. McNulty and 
Freamon alter the dead bodies of homeless people to make it look as though they have 
been victims of a serial killer. This story captures the attention of the press and from the 
additional resources generated in this hunt for an imaginary serial killer, Lester Freamon 
transfers over funds to help build the case against Marlow Stanfield. The two most ‘natu-
ral police’ in The Wire responsible for this are clearly guilty of a lack of professionalism, 
of not respecting the chain of command, of dishonesty in fabricating the existence of a 
serial killer; their behaviour is a serious criminal offence. They thus break the two key 
normative orders of bureaucratic authority and, most crucially, law. Their motives, how-
ever, are those of competent, ‘good police’, as they use the money to drive their investi-
gation into the brutal Marlow Stanfield.
There is also a clash between different codes of policing when Deputy Commissioner 
Rawls and Daniels (now Commissioner) have an altercation with McNulty when this is 
discovered (The Wire, season 5, episode 10). McNulty has engaged in an act of resistance 
that consisted of acting flagrantly against the normative orders of law and bureaucratic 
authority. Rawls’ immediate response – as a figure who works according to ‘the numbers 
game’ – is to highlight that the serial killer fabrication means that he has been paid unjus-
tified overtime; while McNulty stresses that ‘it wasn’t about the money’ it was about 
capturing Stanfield. Commissioner Cedric Daniels meanwhile remains silent and exudes 
authority as he stands back while Rawls berates McNulty. Daniels simply states: ‘So this 
is your last case; work it.’ Cedric Daniels consistently and quietly reflects a different 
code and set of normative orders concentrated around law and bureaucratic authority – 
while simultaneously being guided by a clear sense of organizational task (Du Gay and 
Vikkelsø, 2017).
Cedric Daniels: The ethical bureaucrat
Daniels is an important character because he presents a third and thus far overlooked 
ethical code in The Wire: that of the ethical bureaucrat. The ethical bureaucrat (Du Gay, 
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2000: 29) does not fit neatly into either the numbers game or natural police codes. The 
‘good bureaucrat’ acts according to the normative orders of competence, bureaucratic 
authority and law; while breaking from ‘the numbers game’ when it fundamentally 
contravenes these normative orders. The ‘good bureaucrat’ is defined through adher-
ence to procedure; acceptance of sub- and superordination; an ‘abnegation of personal 
moral enthusiasms’ that reflects an ethos of impartiality when handling cases (Nash, 
2019); and an underlying commitment to the task of office (see also Du Gay and 
Vikkelsø, 2017).
This conception of the ethical bureaucrat is distinctive because it is specific and con-
textual rather than presenting an ethics based around universal principles, since offices 
embody different purposes (Du Gay, 2008: 151). The ethical bureaucrat judges with 
discretion appropriate conduct according to their role in a given situation. It thus serves 
as a general orientation towards practice rather than something that can be definitively 
embodied in a single type. The ethos of the bureaucrat is based on ‘an ensemble of pur-
poses and ideals within a given code of conduct’ (Du Gay, 2000: 4), and is thus particular 
to one’s institutional context and position in working life.
Daniels is initially a Lieutenant – an important but common middle management 
position in the Baltimore police force – who is promoted to Major and then Colonel over 
the course of the five series, before resigning soon after becoming Commissioner at the 
end of season 5. In tracing Daniels’ conduct and his professional successes, he is clearly 
an imperfect and, like most characters in The Wire, at times a morally questionable fig-
ure. But he also commands loyalty and admiration. One of the most striking features of 
the show is that, in the professional world of managing the police force, there are no 
moral heroes who can be identified as unambiguously on the side of good (see McMillan, 
2009). Daniels’ past behaviour is difficult to square with the principled approach we see 
him adopt as a more senior figure in the police force. He has a long-standing case of cor-
ruption hanging over him when he worked in the Eastern District, prior to when we fol-
low the character on the show. Early on, Daniels contravenes other elements of the 
ethical bureaucrat code by trying to secure arrests quickly to please senior managers, or 
helping an officer who belongs to his unit to concoct a story after he seriously injures a 
young boy in an unprovoked attack (The Wire, season 1, episode 2). But these incidents 
are concentrated in the early episodes of the first series. By the end of the first series, he 
consistently displays the distinctive code of an ethical bureaucrat, a position he holds to 
despite accompanying tensions in subsequent series. Daniels grows into the role of the 
ethical bureaucrat; his principles and professional ethos develop over the course of the 
five series – which highlights how agents can move between different normative orders 
over the course of working life.
What makes Daniels such an interesting figure is that rather than simply rejecting or 
decrying performance measures and ‘the numbers game’, he offers a more nuanced char-
acterization of the choices middle managers in public institutions are faced with when 
they work with, or work around (rather than against), performance measures in different 
contexts (see also McGivern and Ferlie, 2007). The four attributes of the ‘good bureau-
crat’ that Du Gay (2000) emphasizes provide a useful frame to situate Daniels’ conduct: 
acceptance of sub- and superordination; adherence to procedure; abnegation of personal 
moral enthusiasms; and commitment to the purposes of office.
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First, sub- and superordination is displayed through Daniels’ conduct on the show, 
strongly reflected in his references to ‘the chain of command’ (see Herbert, 1997: 4). 
Daniels invokes the ‘chain of command’ as a responsibility that should not only be 
adhered to but actively followed. In terms of superordination, this is reflected in the third 
series when two of his detectives, Kima and McNulty, pursue a criminal investigation of 
a drug king pin, Stringer Bell, rather than the mid-level dealer they have been ordered to 
target. In response, he brings them to his office and reminds them of his rank (The Wire, 
season 3, episode 6). 
Second, in regard to adherence to procedure and due process, Daniels’ commitment to 
this is reflected when his detectives find $20,000 of money in a vehicle – and they have 
strong reasons to suspect that the money has come from a gang selling heroin in the 
Baltimore building projects. It quickly becomes evident that the driver of the vehicle 
with the money in banded, manicured bills is a Senatorial Aide. Commissioner Burrell, 
as a strategic gamer and political opportunist, immediately orders that the money be 
returned, and the investigation shut down. But in holding to the ideals of equality before 
the law and adherence to procedure, Daniels insists the money be kept as it constitutes a 
case of ‘civil forfeiture’ (The Wire, season 1, episode 8). Ultimately however, Daniels 
acts according to the chain of command and following Commissioner Burrell’s insist-
ence, orders that the $20,000 be returned.
Third, through his abnegation of personal moral enthusiasms, rather than holding 
grudges or the desire to pursue vendettas, Cedric Daniels retains his commitment to 
organizational task by making sure the best detectives available are recruited to work on 
his cases, including Jimmy McNulty, despite regular altercations with him during the 
five series for going outside the chain of command. Finally, in terms of organizational 
task, Cedric Daniels often has to protect his organizational units and the work of his 
officers from the bosses’ desire for ‘fast and clean and simple’ (Jimmy McNulty, The 
Wire, season 4, episode 13) cases, with some quick arrests. Daniels does so with a con-
sistent and clear sense of the ‘task’ and detail of the organizational units he leads (Du 
Gay and Vikkelsø, 2017). For example, while working as the Lieutenant of Major Crimes 
in season 1, he convinces Commissioner Burrell to keep the wire taps running, and 
thereby ultimately secures higher-level arrests (The Wire, season 1, episode 6).
Discussion
What then does the tracing of normative orders on The Wire tell us about surveillance, 
control and resistance? While contrasting subject positions have been drawn out previ-
ously in relation to performance management (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002; Ball and 
Wilson, 2000; Thomas and Davies, 2005), the concept of ‘normative orders’ adds a valu-
able additional means of analysis, by shifting the focus to the particular codes people 
adopt in working life. Herbert’s (1997) conception of normative orders gives us a richer 
and more pluralistic perspective in drawing out the codes that different characters 
embody, in a way that is not reducible to a single theoretical framework. Herbert’s con-
ception of normative orders brings Weber’s conception of bureaucracy and Foucault’s 
analysis of power together. Both of these theoretical approaches have an affinity with 
different characters in The Wire’s depiction of the Baltimore City police force.
In drawing on Du Gay’s reading of Weber and applying the concept of the ‘ethical 
bureaucrat’ to Daniels, and the Foucauldian conception of the enterprising (neoliberal) 
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self to Deputy Commissioner Rawls, we have argued that the codes of different charac-
ters reflect a certain distinct constellation of normative orders. It should be noted that 
these distinct codes are lived in and through institutions in which neoliberalization and 
the spread of market competition into the social sphere (Foucault, 2008) is predominant. 
Thus, by the end of the fifth series Daniels has resigned from the police force to become 
a lawyer, while Rawls is promoted to Superintendent of Maryland State Police. At the 
same time The Wire highlights that this is by no means a one directional process (Doolin, 
2002: 375) in which bureaucrats consistently hold to one code of conduct in all circum-
stances. Individuals live through normative orders and in so doing respond to dominant 
institutional demands by strategically working with them, complying, working around or 
resisting them, and often some combination of these at different points.
Surveillance, control and discretion
Turning first to the question of surveillance and control, and what the depiction of per-
formance measurement in the Baltimore police force on The Wire suggests here. Sewell 
and Baker (2006: 939) define surveillance as ‘the few watching over the many’; while 
Bell (2005: 90) characterizes surveillance as ‘the practice of gathering and sorting data 
with the explicit purpose of influencing and managing the data target’. This difference in 
emphasis is a significant one. The first alludes to control and influencing behaviour 
through direct observation; while the latter refers to shaping and controlling behaviour 
through the abstraction of the performance measure that is then lived by subjects (Fay 
et al., 2010). The Wire highlights how these measures are lived and responded to at dif-
ferent levels in different ways according to one’s code and one’s affinities with particular 
normative orders: in a broader context in which discretion, in the sense of unsupervised 
conduct, is an inescapable element of policing (see Kleinig, 1999); running somewhat 
counter to the story of ever more pervasive organizational control that crafts subjectivi-
ties in its wake (see Alvesson and Willmott, 2002; Kärreman and Alvesson, 2009; 
McCabe, 2011) – at times in accounts of enhanced surveillance under NPM elements of 
discretion are (briefly) noted, albeit marginal ones (Clarke and Knights, 2015: 1875; 
McCann et al., 2020: 436). For example, Iedema and Rhodes (2010: 199) argue that 
undecided spaces remain that are not determined by ‘surveillance-based discipline’. This 
can only apply to a greater extent in public institutions with contested purposes (see 
Hoggett, 1996, 2006) and significant levels of discretion. Performance measurement 
reconstitutes and shapes elements of discretion but does not eliminate them, which leaves 
some space for the embodiment of different codes and normative orders. 
It should be noted at the same time that some provisos are in order to better situate 
discretion in policing on The Wire: first, those characters that choose to undertake deep 
investigations tend to be the most skilled and capable detectives and middle managers 
(most obviously Jimmy McNulty, Lester Freamon and Cedric Daniels). Certain charac-
ters are inclined to follow the numbers game arguably more through necessity than 
choice. Take Sergeant Jay Landsman the survivalist follower of the numbers game, or 
Detective Michael Santangelo who as a result of having a backlog of unsolved cases is 
pressured by Major Rawls into monitoring and informing him about McNulty’s conduct 
in season 1. It must also be recognized that as performance measurement becomes 
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coercive in a context of growing insecurity, discretion is further circumscribed (see 
McCann et al., 2020), even if the nature of certain professions makes it impossible to 
remove entirely. Professional sanction in The Wire for violating the normative order of 
‘the numbers game’, or breaking from the chain of command and thus bureaucratic 
authority, tends to result in demotion (after senior managers discover in what unit the 
individual would least like to work) – which of course is a more potent threat at senior 
levels. But it tends not to result in losing one’s job, sackings are normally reserved for 
those that are discovered to have broken the two key normative orders of bureaucratic 
authority and (crucially) the law itself. McNulty and Freamon’s fabrication of a serial 
killer in season 5 and Bunny Colvin’s Hamsterdam experiment in season 3 are both 
examples of this. The analysis of normative orders goes beyond a stress on ever more 
pervasive workplace controls (see, for example, Manley and Williams, 2019; Saunder 
and Espeland, 2009) by recognizing discretion; but it also raises some further important 
questions about how we might understand resistance.
From resistance to normative orders
The organizational literature has seen contributions in which resistance has been vari-
ously reclassified: as micro resistance (Thomas and Davies, 2005), decaf resistance 
(Contu, 2008), cynical resistance (Fleming and Spicer, 2003), pragmatic resistance 
(McCabe et al., 2020), productive resistance (Courpasson et al., 2012), and some critical 
discussions around whether these actually constitute resistance at all (see Contu, 2008; 
Fleming and Spicer, 2003). But we argue that there is a strong case for shifting the ana-
lytical focus in some cases away from how resistance is best classified, to the codes that 
actors embody when choosing not only whether to resist or when to comply, but how to 
comply and how to utilize the elements of discretion that actors possess in certain profes-
sions. This is particularly apposite in cases in which resistance tends to be individualized 
and the absence of collective mobilization through union organization is marked (see 
Thompson and Ackroyd, 1995). As demonstrated in season 2, centring on the impover-
ished position of stevedores at the Baltimore docks, in which organized collective resist-
ance is confined to stealing a police truck and sending photographs of its travels between 
ports to the strategic gamer, political opportunist and future Baltimore Police 
Commissioner, Major Valchek. That said, consistently in The Wire actors live and work 
according to different codes that reflect contrasting normative orders. As Ackroyd (2012: 
4) notes, ‘the impulse to misbehave seldom comes simply from a desire to break rules, 
but from something more positive’. The conception of normative orders gives us a firm 
basis to trace out these alternative, at times ‘more positive’, codes of working life.
The concept of normative orders highlights the ambiguous terrain between compliance 
and resistance within realms of discretion. The character of Cedric Daniels is particularly 
relevant for the analysis here because, while he has a number of conflicts with senior 
managers, including Major Rawls and Commissioner Burrell, his conduct cannot really 
be regarded as ‘resistance’ in any conventional sense. Cedric Daniels would certainly not 
characterize his own conduct as resistant to professional police lines of authority, since he 
only goes outside the chain of the command in exceptional circumstances on a couple of 
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occasions. For example, when he has a discussion with the new Mayor Thomas Carcetti 
in private about how the ‘stats game’ is damaging policing in Baltimore (The Wire, season 
4, episode 10). Even on these occasions, Daniels acts according to some of the normative 
orders that are characteristic of the ethical bureaucrat through his deep sense of organiza-
tional task, which is centred on how the police might build viable prosecution cases 
against high-level criminals. Thus, the concept of normative orders sheds far more light 
on Daniels’ conduct than the concept of resistance. He acts consistently according to the 
normative orders of bureaucratic authority, law and competence – although this often 
comes into conflict with senior managers who ascribe to the normative order of the num-
bers game.
These tensions culminate in his resignation as Baltimore City Police Commissioner at 
the end of season 5. Soon after Daniels attains the top senior management role of Baltimore 
City Police Commissioner, he is asked to reorder his conduct in favour of the ‘numbers 
game’. He is approached by his now ex-partner and aspiring councilwoman, Marla 
Daniels, who tells him that there is political pressure to artificially improve the statistical 
performance of the Baltimore police force and that if he fails to do so, the report about his 
links to past corruption will be made public and as a result his career will be finished. 
After Cedric Daniels refuses Marla Daniels’ request that he ‘juke the stats’ – as instructed 
by Nerese Campbell, the strategic and ambitious President of Baltimore City Council – 
the conversation continues:
Marla Daniels:  Then you’re done. There’s enough in that file that you’ll never 
make it through confirmation hearings and enough so that my 
career’s dead before it even gets started. The tree that doesn’t bend 
breaks, Cedric.
Cedric Daniels:  Bend too far you’re already broken. (The Wire, season 5, episode 10)
This reaction means the end of Cedric Daniels as a manager in the police force, as he opts 
finally to leave the organization. Interestingly, Marla’s comment about the need to ‘bend’ 
with the institutional tree, implies that some element of compromising with, or ‘bend-
ing’, to the powerful normative order of the numbers game is a necessary part of the job. 
Indeed, as Clarke (2005: 221) notes, in many public institutions today ‘it is impossible to 
stand aloof from the evaluative/competitive nexus, since it has resource and reputational 
consequences’. The implication is that this is a reality in politics as well as the police 
force, and more broadly in the ‘tree’ of institutional hierarchies subject to NPM. The idea 
that one must bend to the numbers game in order to survive, is an important counter-
weight to Daniels’ refusal to give ground. Not resigning and ‘bending the stats’ according 
to the wishes of political leaders would have entailed the abandonment of his ethical 
commitments as a professional bureaucrat; this would have meant rendering himself 
subordinate to a code of policing and management that becomes reduced to an instru-
mental ‘statistical game’. The clear implication here is that it is at the higher echelons of 
police management where the normative order of ‘the numbers game’ is most strongly 
enforced; and competence and social morality are very much subordinate to it.
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Concluding remarks
This article has engaged with some of the conflicting codes around performance meas-
urement as depicted in the HBO series, The Wire, which we have characterized as a piece 
of social science fiction (Penfold-Mounce et al., 2011). Although there have been some 
interesting engagements with dramatic fiction in the management and organization stud-
ies field (see, for example, Knights and Willmott, 1999; Rhodes and Parker, 2008), we 
think that social science fiction is a concept that adds extra weight to these debates by 
encouraging us to consider series like The Wire alongside, rather than as subordinate to, 
academic work in related fields.
What The Wire offers us that conventional empirical research cannot really provide is 
an understanding of how the codes of different actors, and the particular normative orders 
they reflect, unfold over time in relation to the institutions they work for. This takes us 
beyond a search for what is and is not resistance, to something arguably richer and also 
closer to many people’s experiences of working life, in which at different points actors 
compromise, work against, work around or actively support a given set of dominant 
institutional normative orders over the course of their career. It is this focus on the 
unfolding codes and normative orders of working life that provides a contextualization 
of the circumstances in which resistance or misbehaviour happens, but also highlights 
how actors in public bureaucracies at times work within a realm of discretion that gives 
rise to the development of multiple normative orders. The police officer serves as a par-
ticularly interesting case here since it is the street-level bureaucrat which is ‘perhaps the 
most controversial and the most subject to conflicting goal expectations’ (Lipsky, 2010: 
47). Yet, there is a strong basis to suggest that similar kinds of conflicts and multiple 
normative orders operate across public institutions that have been subject to NPM (see 
Bohte and Meier, 2000; Hood, 2006; Muller, 2018; Nash, 2019).
Thus, the key contribution of this article has been to apply the concept of normative 
orders to develop our understanding of control, surveillance and resistance in The Wire as 
a piece of rich social science fiction. This intervention is significant in the following 
respects: first, the concept of normative orders offers a tool to trace out the codes of mul-
tiple actors in public sector institutions in a manner that is not reducible to a dualistic 
framework of resistance or compliance (see also Sewell and Barker, 2006). This also adds 
to our understanding of The Wire by helping us to trace out the multiple codes of policing 
depicted on the show, which takes us beyond the natural police versus statistical gamer 
division that others have been critical of (Brooks, 2009). Second, this conception of nor-
mative orders helps us to explore how and why, in professions with a clear element of 
discretion, actors find ways of working around or in spite of performance measures, rather 
than against them (see also McGivern and Ferlie, 2007). Third, the emphasis on normative 
orders inverts the focus from how and when actors resist, to the codes by which actors live 
and work in public institutions, who may contravene dominant normative orders in certain 
instances and not others. It should be noted that what appears to be far more important 
than resistance for David Simon and Ed Burns in their sociological dramatization of the 
Baltimore police force is the codes of working life, and the normative orders particular 
characters adopt in relation to the pressures of NPM and performance measurement. We 
suggest that, particularly in working environments with significant elements of discretion, 
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such a shift in focus towards normative orders could have real value for future studies of 
how surveillance and performance measurement are lived through and responded to by 
different individuals.
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Note
1 Although this perspective is clearly far too gender specific for the argument we wish to pre-
sent here. This example of overly masculine centred terminology does highlight some impor-
tant grounds to raise critical questions about The Wire around its rather dated characterization 
of gender relations and the female characters that are depicted in the Baltimore police force 
on the show. While there are some strong female characters they tend to serve as secondary 
figures in the construction of the overall narrative (Stearns, 2011). One could argue that this 
arises from the documentary-like perspective of the show that portrays the machismo often 
displayed in policework, and this has been discussed in some of the literature on policing 
(see, for example, Herbert, 2001). Yet classic series like The Wire also have the opportu-
nity to problematize and challenge the gendered realities they depict in different ways, given 
their rich sociological insight and scope. From our perspective this is an important issue to 
highlight and consider even though it is not the primary concern in the analysis that follows, 
although failed machismo is a theme that we will touch on. See Stearns (2011) for a well-
made critique of the position of female characters in The Wire.
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